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An Elegant Solution to Network Inadequacy: How
to Better Protect Patients from Inadequate Health
Networks and Surprise Balance Billing
LEAH SELBY GRAY†
The American health care system is far from ideal. Health insurance is expensive, yet often
inadequate, and patients can fall into bankruptcy paying for necessary medical care. Patients
often face challenges finding physicians and other providers that accept their insurance due to
network inadequacy, which can end up costing them thousands. Federal law offers few
protections to patients from the costs of inadequate networks, so some states have passed
legislation to protect patients from surprise balance bills. This Note analyzes the enduring nature
of the network inadequacy problem and proposes an elegant solution: state single payer. While it
would be politically and administratively challenging, a state single payer system would be the
most efficient solution to inadequate networks and surprise balance billing.

†
J.D. Candidate 2019, University of California, Hastings College of the Law; Senior Production Editor,
Hastings Law Journal. I would like to thank Professors Jamie King and Thomas Greaney for their invaluable
advice and guidance on this Note, as well as the Hastings Law Journal staff who work tirelessly to make our
journal excellent. Finally, I dedicate this Note to my husband, and thank him for his endless patience and
willingness to discuss health policy with me.
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INTRODUCTION
Efforts to achieve a high-quality, low-cost health care system in the United
States have resulted in a uniquely American combination of public and private
payer systems. Private health insurance has long been available, but was not
always sufficient, so the health system has slowly changed to meet the needs of
the people.
In Part I, this Note will analyze the inadequacies of the U.S. health care
system, leading up to the implementation of the Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act (ACA). Part II then turns to overly narrow networks,
exploring why and how they have become inadequate to meet patients’ needs,
including the result of skinny networks—surprise balance billing. Part III
addresses the minimal federal regulation on the matter, and Part IV explores
state solutions to inadequate networks and surprise balance billing, concluding
that regulation alone is insufficient to address consumer risks. In Part V, this
Note will assess private sector solutions to overly narrow networks and surprise
balance billing. Finally, Part VI concludes that states should work towards
implementing single payer systems because current regulations and market
solutions are not the optimal way to address network inadequacy and surprise
balance billing.
I. BACKGROUND: THE U.S. HEALTH SYSTEM
The U.S. health “system” consists of piecemeal federal legislation, fifty
different sets of state laws, and hundreds of private insurers and health providers.
It is necessary to understand how different parts of American health care evolved
and now work together in order to understand why the United States has been
unable to provide adequate health networks, which results in surprise balance
billing and widespread medical debt.
A. THE FEDERAL REGULATORY SCHEME
The federal government developed a few health insurance systems, which
attempt to cover the most vulnerable members of the population while leaving
others to obtain private insurance on their own. Congress established two public
health insurance programs, Medicare and Medicaid, in 1965, and in 1997, it
created the Children’s Health Insurance Program (CHIP).1 Medicare is a federal
health insurance program for people over sixty-five years old and younger
people with certain qualifying disabilities, while Medicaid is the insurance
program for low-income adults, pregnant women, and those with disabilities.2
CHIP, as the name suggests, is the federal insurance program for children whose
1. CMS Program History, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS. (last modified June 20, 2018, 2:36
PM) https://www.cms.gov/About-CMS/Agency-information/History.
2. Medicaid, MEDICAID.GOV, https://www.medicaid.gov/medicaid/index.html (last visited July 27,
2019); What’s Medicare? MEDICARE.GOV, https://www.medicare.gov/sign-up-change-plans/decide-how-toget-medicare/whats-medicare/what-is-medicare.html (last visited July 27, 2019).
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parents’ incomes are too high to qualify for Medicaid, yet insufficient to afford
private insurance.3 While created by the federal government, states run their own
Medicaid and CHIP programs with varying amounts of federal funding.4 In
particular, Medicare is broken down into four parts labeled A through D, with
parts C and D being available through private insurers that contract with
Medicare.5 Furthermore, the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
(ERISA) regulates the insurance plans employers provide to their employees.6
The way Medicaid, CHIP, and Medicare’s four parts cover different groups of
people through such different mechanisms, and how some health plans are
regulated federally but others are left exclusively to state regulation, highlights
the fragmented nature of federal health care.
Ballooning health care costs in the 1990s and 2000s finally led to the
passage of the ACA in 2010, which imposed new requirements on individuals
and insurers and regulated the private insurance market.7 The ACA gave states
the opportunity to expand Medicaid to cover low-income individuals who are
technically above the poverty line, and thirty-seven states and the District of
Columbia have elected to do so.8 In addition, the ACA created platforms,
referred to as the marketplace or exchanges, for people to shop for and compare
health plans.9 The ACA categorizes plans into metal tiers, based on actuarial
values, with bronze being the least expensive and providing the thinnest
coverage, and platinum being the most expensive and providing the most
comprehensive coverage.10 While twenty-eight states let the federal government
run the marketplaces, twelve states have established their own marketplaces, and
the remaining states use a hybrid of state and federal marketplaces.11 Thus, even

3. Eligibility, MEDICAID.GOV, https://www.medicaid.gov/chip/eligibility-standards/index.html (last
visited July 27, 2019).
4. Children’s Health Insurance Program, MEDICAID.GOV, https://www.medicaid.gov/chip/index.html
(last visited July 27, 2019); How Original Medicare Works, MEDICARE.GOV, https://www.medicare.gov/whatmedicare-covers/your-medicare-coverage-choices/how-original-medicare-works (last visited July 27, 2019);
Medicaid, supra note 2.
5. MEDICAID.GOV, supra note 2.
6. Fact Sheet: What Is ERISA?, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, EMP. BENEFITS SEC. ADMIN., https://www.dol.gov/
agencies/ebsa/about-ebsa/our-activities/resource-center/fact-sheets/what-is-erisa (last visited July 27, 2019).
7. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010) (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. (2012)).
8. Rachel Garfield et al., The Coverage Gap: Uninsured Poor Adults in States that Do Not Expand
Medicaid, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Mar. 21, 2019), https://www.kff.org/medicaid/issue-brief/the-coverage-gapuninsured-poor-adults-in-states-that-do-not-expand-medicaid/; Status of State Medicaid Expansion Decisions:
Interactive Map, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Apr. 26, 2019) https://www.kff.org/medicaid/issue-brief/status-of-statemedicaid-expansion-decisions-interactive-map/.
9. Sarah Kliff, What Is a Health Insurance Marketplace?, VOX (Jan. 5, 2017, 2:33 PM),
https://www.vox.com/cards/obamacare/what-is-a-health-insurance-exchange.
10. What the Actuarial Values in the Affordable Care Act Mean, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Apr. 1, 2011)
https://www.kff.org/health-reform/issue-brief/what-the-actuarial-values-in-the-affordable/.
11. State Health Insurance Marketplace Types, 2018, KAISER FAM. FOUND. https://www.kff.org/healthreform/state-indicator/state-health-insurance-marketplace-types/?currentTimeframe=0&sortModel=%7B
%22colId%22:%22Location%22,%22sort%22:%22asc%22%7D#note-2 (last visited July 27, 2019). For
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with the ACA, the type and quality of health plans, and the method by which
people purchase them, vary greatly across states. This variability allows for more
diverse plans and systems, which lead to inadequate health networks.
B. FORMS OF PRIVATE HEALTH PLANS
The fall of health maintenance organizations (HMOs) catalyzed the ACA
because it revealed that the market could not control rapidly rising health costs.12
HMOs provide private health insurance plans that restrict enrollees to a limited
network of providers and exclusively pays for care received from those
providers.13 HMOs typically pay in-network providers a capitated amount per
member per month, meaning they receive a flat rate per enrollee regardless of
what services they actually provide.14 HMOs gained popularity in the late 1980s
and early 1990s, but were met with a strong backlash in the later 1990s as their
exclusive networks prevented patients from receiving care from any provider
they chose, and in some cases, even necessary care within their networks.15 As
consumer advocates protested limited networks, they also revealed the financial
insolvency of many HMOs.16 The lack of patient choice and the financial
problems with HMOs led to state regulation on HMO solvency and health
coverage, and a shift away from HMOs.17
In the wake of the HMOs’ failures, preferred provider organizations
(PPOs) emerged as the more popular option.18 Unlike HMOs, PPOs do not limit
their enrollees to a specific network of providers; however, enrollees do have to
pay different prices based on the providers they choose.19 Unlike the capitated,
flat fee structure of HMOs, PPOs typically reimburse providers using a fee-forservice model.20 PPOs gained huge popularity in the 2000s, but while they afford
patients more choice, the fee-for-service reimbursement structure was one of the
main reasons health care costs spun out of control.21 The ACA was necessary to
address the rapidly rising cost of healthcare from HMOs and then PPOs.

example, California runs its own marketplace called Covered California. What Is Covered California?, COVERED
CAL., https://www.coveredca.com/what-is-covered-california (last visited July 27, 2019).
12. Deborah Farringer, Everything Old Is New Again: Will Narrow Networks Succeed Where HMOs
Failed?, 34 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 299, 311 (2016).
13. Id. at 305.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 307. Some of the HMO networks were so limited that patients had to go out of network in order
to get medically required treatment.
16. Id. at 308–09.
17. Id. at 308–310. Forty-seven states enacted legislation based on the 2003 National Association of
Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) HMO Model Act. Id. at 309, 309 n.51.
18. Id. at 310.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 311.
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C. THE IMPACT OF THE ACA
Before the ACA, insurance companies could determine which patients to
insure and at what price, so they often avoided insuring those who would need
the most care.22 For instance, insurers could refuse to offer coverage to
individuals with “pre-existing” conditions or only agree to do so at an
astronomically high cost.23 Historically, some states required health insurers to
cover certain types of benefits, but the ACA made it illegal across the United
States to discriminate on the basis of any pre-existing conditions.24 The ACA
also requires health plans to cover certain “essential health benefits.”25 Because
insurance companies now have to cover all individuals, regardless of health
status, the ACA forced insurance companies to change the way they were doing
business and making profits.
As a result, national spending on health insurance increased.26 This rise,
however, was supposed to be temporary, as experts assumed the individual
mandate would bring costs down in the long term.27 The individual mandate in
the ACA was the requirement that all qualifying citizens must have health
insurance or pay a tax penalty.28 Insurance companies make their profits on
premiums paid by healthy people who do not use the majority of services that
the insurance would cover. However, sick people need a lot of care, so they are
more expensive to insure. When healthy people are in the pool of those insured,
the health plans can pay for the care of those who are really sick without having
to raise overall premiums.29 The individual mandate is a contentious but
necessary part of the ACA, as it keeps the system from falling into a “death
spiral.”30 If the only people buying insurance are those who are sick, premiums
22. Elena Gordon, Pre-Obamacare, Preexisting Conditions Long Vexed States and Insurers, KAISER
HEALTH NEWS (Apr. 26, 2017), https://khn.org/news/pre-obamacare-preexisting-conditions-long-vexed-statesand-insurers/.
23. Id.; MARK A. HALL & PAUL B. GINSBURG, A BETTER APPROACH TO REGULATING PROVIDER NETWORK
ADEQUACY 2–3 (USC-Brookings Schaeffer Initiative for Health Policy ed., 2017).
24. John V. Jacobi, et al., Health Insurer Market Behavior After the Affordable Care Act: Assessing the
Need for Monitoring, Targeted Enforcement, and Regulatory Reform, 120 PENN ST. L. REV. 109, 114–15 (2015);
Pre-Existing
Conditions,
HHS.GOV,
https://www.hhs.gov/healthcare/about-the-aca/pre-existingconditions/index.html.
25. 42 U.S.C. §§ 300gg-6(a) (2012), 18022(b)(1) (2012). Essential health benefits include ambulatory
patient services, emergency services, hospitalization, maternity and newborn care, mental health and substance
use disorder services (including behavioral health treatment), prescription drugs, rehabilitative and habilitative
services and devices, laboratory services, preventive and wellness services and chronic disease management,
and pediatric services (including oral and vision care).
26. Janet Weiner et al., Effects of the ACA on Health Care Cost Containment, LEONARD DAVIS INS. OF
HEALTH ECON., Mar. 2, 2017, at 1–2, https://ldi.upenn.edu/brief/effects-aca-health-care-cost-containment.
27. Harold Pollack, 30 Economists: We Need Individual Mandate, HEALTHINSURANCE.ORG (July 18,
2013), https://www.healthinsurance.org/blog/2013/07/18/30-economists-we-need-the-individual-mandate.
28. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 574 (2012) (holding the individual mandate
constitutional as a valid exercise of Congress’s taxing powers).
29. Pollack, supra note 27 (“The mandate expresses a basic obligation of citizenship as well as an economic
reality. Without the mandate, some people will choose to gamble or to free-ride, undermining the fairness and
financial stability of the health insurance system.”).
30. Sebelius, 567 U.S. at 619.
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skyrocket and health insurance becomes as expensive as paying health costs out
of pocket.31
While Congress was unable to repeal the ACA in 2017, the 2017 Tax Cuts
and Jobs Act removed the penalty for qualifying individuals who choose not to
buy health insurance.32 The penalty removal was expected to cause a sharp
increase in insurance premiums and out-of-pocket limits as healthy individuals
leave the pool of enrollees, resulting in a version of the death spiral as predicted
would happen if the ACA was originally enacted without the individual
mandate.33 However, the markets have been remarkably stable, indicating
support for the ACA’s reforms and that healthy people, on the whole, still see
the value of health insurance.34 Premiums actually went down one percent, but
experts note that given the current strong economy consumers would have seen
a much greater decrease had Congress not removed the tax penalty.35 Overall,
the lack of an individual mandate indicates that 2018’s stability was probably
temporary, and consumers should expect increased prices and decreased
coverage over the next few years if nothing changes.

II. THE NETWORK ADEQUACY PROBLEM
Given the fragmented, insufficient, and inconsistent nature of healthcare
policies in America, it will come as no surprise that there are flaws in the system
which harm consumers. One of the biggest problems facing patients is
inadequate provider networks, and the crippling debt that comes from surprise
balance billing.
A. THE EMERGENCE OF SKINNY NETWORKS36
As a result of these rising costs caused by increased regulation and healthy
individuals leaving the market, consumers have been increasingly drawn to less
expensive plans, creating a market for inexpensive, overly narrow networks, also
known as “skinny networks.”37 As explained previously, health plans typically
include a network of covered providers where patients can receive care from an
in-network provider, which the plan will cover with lower cost sharing than outof-network providers. Skinny networks simply have fewer providers in the
network and occur in HMOs, PPOs, or other plan structures.38 Insurance
31. Pollack, supra note 27.
32. An Act to Provide for Reconciliation Pursuant to Titles II and V of the Concurrent Resolution on the
Budget for Fiscal Year 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-97, 131 Stat. 2054 (2017); Timothy Jost, The Tax Bill and the
Individual Mandate: What Happened, and What Does it Mean?, HEALTH AFFAIRS BLOG (Dec. 20, 2017),
https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20171220.323429/full.
33. See id.
34. Sarah Kliff, Obamacare is Having a Surprisingly Good Year, VOX (Nov. 26, 2018, 4:35 PM),
https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2018/11/26/18113313/obamacare-mandate-tax.
35. Id.
36. In the context of this Note “skinny networks” will be used to describe overly narrow networks.
37. See Farringer, supra note 12, at 313–14.
38. Id. at 310–11.
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companies started offering skinny network plans as a way to bring down their
costs and increase competition, as they would have to pay a smaller number of
providers.39 The insurance market has responded to the high demand for less
expensive plans, and skinny networks have become extremely popular.40
In theory, narrow networks provide cheaper health plans and increase
market competition between providers, producing higher quality and less
expensive care.41 The lower costs result from lower reimbursement rates, as
providers agree to accept less money per enrollee or service rendered in
exchange for the plan’s promise to deliver a steady stream of patients who can
only get care from that provider. Because such a steady stream of patients is an
attractive offer, providers should compete with each other to be the one the
insurance company decides to accept in the network. That provider competition
should ensure that only the highest quality and fairly priced providers are in the
skinny network. However, patients can experience grave medical and financial
consequences from inadequate network coverage.
B. PROS AND CONS OF SKINNY NETWORKS
The problem with skinny networks is that they are, by their nature,
inadequate. An adequate network should provide plan enrollees with easy access
to a sufficient number of in-network providers so that the enrollee can receive
the health services covered by the plan.42 For healthy patients who do not need
as much care, very narrow networks are perfectly adequate to meet their needs.
Yet, problems arise when those healthy patients suddenly need specialized care
not covered by the network, or if sick patients unwittingly choose a skinny
network.
Proponents of skinny networks praise their low costs while maintaining
high-quality care and encouragement of market competition.43 Some even refer
to skinny networks as “high performance networks.”44 Those who favor skinny
networks point to the fact that they emerged in response to market demands, not
the greed of insurance companies that drove the rise of HMOs.45 When networks
are forced to be too broad, health insurers lose the ability to negotiate lower
prices with providers.46 The threat of being excluded from narrow networks
39. Dan Polsky & Janet Weiner, The Skinny on Narrow Networks in Health Insurance Marketplace Plans,
LEONARD DAVIS INS. OF HEALTH ECON., June 2015, at 1, https://ldi.upenn.edu/sites/default/files/pdf/the-skinnyon-narrow-networks.pdf.
40. See id.
41. See David Blumenthal, Reflecting on Health Reform—Narrow Networks: Boon or Bane?, THE
COMMONWEALTH FUND (Feb. 24, 2014) http://www.commonwealthfund.org/publications/blog/2014/feb/
narrows-networks-boon-or-bane.
42. See Erin C. Fuse Brown, Consumer Financial Protection in Health Care, 95 WASH. U. L. REV. 127,
144 (2017).
43. Farringer, supra note 12, at 311.
44. Id.
45. See id. at 313–14.
46. Katherine Baicker & Helen Levy, How Narrow a Network Is Too Narrow? 175 JAMA INTERNAL MED.
337 (2015).
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should motivate providers to offer efficient and cost-effective care to compete
with other providers.47 In fact, one of the Nation’s leading health economists
found that narrow networks have reduced premiums for enrollees, while
maintaining a high quality of care.48
Yet for all the benefits of skinny networks, just as many, if not more,
consequences exist. As insurers work to keep their premiums low, the least
expensive plans may exclude specialists and highly-regarded academic medical
centers in the narrow networks, preventing sick patients from accessing
necessary and sometimes experimental care.49 Proponents of skinny networks
focus on the premium rates, but do not take into account how expensive using
out-of-network providers can be, which is not reflected in the premiums.50 Plans
may intentionally exclude specialists to discourage already sick or injured
patients from enrolling.51 Unfortunately, patients enrolling in plans with skinny
networks are often unaware they are doing so; thus, patients who need a lot of
specialized care may inadvertently enroll in a plan that fails to provide for their
needs.52 While the ACA requires all plans to cover essential health benefits, it
does not mandate that the plan has to provide those benefits through an innetwork provider. Alternatively, healthy patients may knowingly pick skinny
networks, optimistically ignoring the possibility of a tragic accident or
diagnosis.53 Patients choose skinny networks for their cheap price tag, but that
rate is deceptive when patients need out-of-network care.54
47. Leemore S. Dafny, et al., Narrow Networks on the Health Insurance Marketplaces: Prevalence,
Pricing, and the Cost of Network Breadth, 36 HEALTH AFFAIRS 1606, 1607 (2017).
48. Id.; see also Farringer, supra note 12, at 331–32.
49. See Valarie Blake, Narrow Networks, the Very Sick, and the Patient Protection and Affordable Care
Act: Recalling the Purpose of Health Insurance and Reform, 16 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 63, 68 (2015).
50. See Dafny, supra note 47, at 1608; see also HALL & GINSBURG, supra note 23, at 3.
51. HALL & GINSBURG, supra note 23, at 3.
52. See Blake, supra note 49, at 113. Blake explains that:
Narrow networks present a number of ethical and legal challenges for patient care, especially
access to tertiary care given that it is often life-saving, typically constitutes an essential health benefit,
and is not currently being considered in the law despite the providers of such care being most
frequently excluded from narrow networks.
Id. An additional problem stems from a lack of “health literacy,” as patients struggle to meaningfully compare
plans and navigate America’s notoriously complex health care system. See Brietta Clark, Using Law to Fight a
Silent Epidemic: The Role of Healthy Literacy in Health Care Access, Quality & Cost, 20 ANNALS HEALTH L.
253, 259 (2011). The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services recognizes the problem and defines health
literacy as the extent to which individuals have “the capacity to obtain, process and understand basic health
information and services needed to make appropriate health decisions.” Health Literacy Improvement, U.S.
DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., OFFICE OF DISEASE PREVENTION AND HEALTH PROMOTION (last updated July
24, 2008), https://health.gov/communication/literacy/default.htm.
53. See HALL & GINSBURG, supra note 23, at 3.
54. The problem is particularly pronounced in the individual market. Those who do not get health insurance
through their employer are left to choose plans for themselves, and insurers are taking advantage of people’s
ignorance about how health networks function. See Katherine Hempstead, Marketplace Pulse: Percent of Plans
with Out-of-Network Benefits, ROBERT WOOD JOHNSON FOUND. (Oct. 4, 2018), https://www.rwjf.org/en/
library/research/2018/10/percent-of-plans-with-out-of-network-benefits.html. In the group markets, the share of
employers choosing skinny plans for their employees has been decreasing over the past few years. Drew Altman,
Narrow Health Care Networks Aren’t Actually That Common, AXIOS (Oct. 12, 2018),
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C. SURPRISE BALANCE BILLING
Surprise balance billing is the most harmful consequence of skinny
networks. Patients with skinny networks often do not realize they are receiving
out-of-network care until it is too late—when they have received a bill for an
out-of-network provider. This kind of bill is called a surprise balance bill. The
surprise typically occurs when a patient seeks care from an in-network provider,
but then receives some tangential service from an out-of-network provider or
facility.55 For example, a patient may receive an x-ray at her in-network
provider, but the image could be sent to a non-contracting radiology facility for
diagnosis, resulting in a surprise balance bill from the radiology center. The
“balance” in surprise balance billing refers to the fact that a health plan may
cover a nominal amount of an out-of-network service, but the patient must pay
the balance on the bill.
D. HOW SURPRISE BALANCE BILLING OCCURS
The rise in balance billing is directly caused by the narrowing of networks.
While narrow networks are an effective way to reduce insurance company costs
and enrollee premiums, they can harm patients who need specialized care from
particular out-of-network providers.56 Skinny networks lead to greater
fragmentation in health care delivery and much higher costs for patients who
need out-of-network specialists.57 Accordingly, patients have seen a rise in
surprise balance billing as insurance networks use skinny networks to keep their
own corporate costs down in the face of increased compliance costs and present
lower up-front premiums to enrollees.58
Surprise balance billing often arises in emergency contexts, but is actually
more common in non-emergency situations.59 Frequently, in an emergency
someone calls an ambulance and the ambulance takes the patient to the nearest
hospital, which happens to be outside the patient’s network.60 Surprise balance
billing also often occurs in planned surgery.61 For example, a patient schedules
https://www.axios.com/narrow-health-care-networks-arent-actually-that-common-daeb99fb-45dc-43d2-895bf99c72a2426a.html.
55. Fuse Brown, supra note 42, at 137 (“[T]he three common characteristics of a surprise medical bill are
that it is unanticipated, involuntary, and out-of-network.”).
56. Blake, supra note 49, at 68.
57. Id. at 114–15.
58. With the increase in regulation from the ACA, insurers have to spend more time and money assessing
whether they meet the requirements of each regulation.
59. Karen Pollitz, Surprise Medical Bills, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Mar 17, 2016),
https://www.kff.org/%20private-insurance/issue-brief/surprise-medical-bills (“90% of surprise medical bills
were not for emergency services, but for other in-hospital care.”); see also LIZ HAMEL ET AL., THE BURDEN OF
MEDICAL DEBT: RESULTS FROM THE KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION/NEW YORK TIMES MEDICAL BILLS SURVEY
4 (2016), https://www.kff.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/8806-the-burden-of-medical-debt-results-from-thekaiser-family-foundation-new-york-times-medical-bills-survey.pdf (reporting that 61% of surprise billing came
from emergency room visits, while 65% of surprise billing came from routine doctor visits).
60. See Pollitz, supra note 59.
61. Id.
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knee surgery with his in-network surgeon at an in-network facility. After the
surgery, the patient receives a surprise balance bill from the surgical assistant.
While the patient’s plan covered the surgeon, the surgeon brought in a noncontracting assistant.62 Although the patient did everything he could to stay in
network, he was still left to pay this surprise balance bill. On average, out-ofnetwork surgical assistants bill $13,914, while health plans only pay $1794,
leaving the unsuspecting patient to pay over $12,000.63 Unfortunately, the
problem is not limited to surgical assistants. Surprise balance billing often results
from non-contracting anesthesiologists, radiologists, pathologists, and their
respective facilities. 64 Many providers choose not to join networks because they
can make more money by directly billing patients, instead of getting the lower,
negotiated rate from the plans.
E.

THE FINANCIAL IMPACT OF BALANCE BILLING

Providers can charge anything they choose for out-of-network care,
making the bills often exorbitant, and as such, can cause burdensome medical
debt for even those with insurance.65 Balance bills are often unexpected because
the system is so opaque that even the savviest consumers may not be able to
predict if their care will be in-network. A recent study revealed about thirty
percent of insured patients who had a problem paying their medical bills say the
bill came from an out-of-network provider, and almost seventy percent of those
people were unaware the provider was not in their network at the time they
received the care.66
Surprise balance billing particularly harms patients because payments to
non-contracting providers do not count towards deductibles or out-of-pocket
limitations, such as co-pays or co-insurance payments.67 A deductible is the
amount a plan enrollee pays out-of-pocket before the health plan covers the rest
of the health care for the year.68 A co-pay is typically a nominal amount that the
plan requires patients to pay when they go to see their primary care physician,
specialist, or visit a hospital for emergency services.69 Out-of-pocket costs
include deductibles and co-pays, but not the premium enrollees pay to have the
insurance.70 Plans typically have an out-of-pocket maximum, which means that
62. “Non-contracting” refers to a provider or entity with which a health plan does not have a contract
setting forth the prices the plan will pay for certain procedures. Without a contract, providers may charge the
patient any price they choose.
63. Pollitz, supra note 59.
64. Id.
65. HAMEL ET AL., supra note 59, at 14 (“Among those with medical bill problems, almost identical shares
of the insured (44 percent) and uninsured (45 percent) say the bills have had a major impact on their families.”).
66. Id. at 12.
67. Fuse Brown, supra note 42, at 141.
68. What’s the Difference Between a Deductible and an Out-of-Pocket Limit?, CONSUMER REPORTS (Dec.
6, 2013, 8:41 PM) https://www.consumerreports.org/cro/news/2013/12/what-s-the-difference-between-adeductible-and-an-out-of-pocket-limit/index.htm.
69. Id.
70. Id.
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a plan cannot charge an enrollee co-pays and deductibles once they have reached
the maximum for the year.71 Because insurance companies do not count balance
bills towards the out-of-pocket maximum, there is no limit on what patients can
be liable to pay for those bills.72
Medical debt devastates the finances of many Americans as they drain their
savings to pay for their health care.73 Patients with large medical bills report
reducing their spending on food, clothing, and household necessities, increasing
their credit card debt, and taking on second jobs to pay their bills.74 As
previously mentioned, people making these sacrifices to pay for medical care
often have insurance, but their insurance does not cover all the care they need.75
Given the harmful nature of inadequate networks and surprise balance
billing, both the private sector and legislatures have responded with solutions.
Since the ACA was enacted, the federal government has begun to regulate
network adequacy, but has not yet solved the problem of surprise balance billing.
As such, the most effective solutions have come from the private sector and the
states.

III. FEDERAL REGULATION
The federal government’s attempts to regulate network adequacy have
been limited by the language of the ACA, and perhaps by an inclination of the
Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) to delegate this difficult
issue to the states.76 Furthermore, ERISA limits the ability of state protections
from applying to all of the state’s citizens.
A. THE ACA
The ACA includes some statutory language about network adequacy,77 but
does not set out requirements for what constitutes an adequate network, and
delegates the responsibility of regulating network adequacy to CMS.78 However,
the Trump Administration recently transferred that duty from CMS to the
states.79 Health experts fear that the states are currently unprepared to take on

71. Id.
72. Fuse Brown, supra note 42, at 138.
73. HAMEL ET AL., supra note 59, at 15.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. See Fuse Brown, supra note 42, at 155.
77. See 42 U.S.C. § 18031 (2012).
78. Id.; 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-1 (2012).
79. Mark Hall & Caitlin Brandt, Network Adequacy Under the Trump Administration, HEALTH AFFAIRS
BLOG (Sept. 14, 2017), https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20170914.061958/full. Hall and Brandt
report:
Under the Obama administration, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) reviewed
all qualified health plans (QHPs) in the ACA market in states that did not operate their own
exchanges. Through this review process, CMS ensured that all QHPs on the federally facilitated
exchanges met basic quantitative standards designed to ensure network adequacy. . . . With this final
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this regulation, as most have relied on the federal government, choosing not to
establish their own network adequacy standards.80 Especially with the federal
government putting the regulatory burden on states, experts predict skinny
networks are not going away anytime soon.81
While overly narrow networks are a nationwide problem, the federal
government has done nothing to address surprise balance billing. In fact, as the
ACA explicitly exempts balance billing from its cost-sharing provisions, CMS
has no statutory authority to create regulations that would protect patients from
surprise balance billing.82 Balance billing statutes are integrally linked with cost
sharing. As the ACA excludes “balance billing” from its definition of cost
sharing, CMS cannot create a regulation that touches on surprise balance billing.
Thus, only states have the capability to protect patients from surprise balance
billing.
B. ERISA PREEMPTION
Yet, even the most robust state solutions cannot protect all patients,
because ERISA prevents state protections from applying to the large proportion
of Americans who get their health insurance through employer-sponsored health
plans. ERISA completely preempts many state protections, including state
balance billing laws.83 Many people get their health insurance through their
employer, and those plans are governed by ERISA.84 The “black hole” of ERISA
makes it so patients who are insured through an employee benefit plan are not
protected from surprise balance bills, even in states like California and New
York.85
C. POTENTIAL FEDERAL LEGISLATION
As exorbitant surprise medical bills grab the media’s attention, Congress
is considering legislation to address the problem.86 After President Trump
rule, the Trump administration eliminated this federal review process, ceding network adequacy
regulation to the states, even those that might prefer to wash their hands of the process.
Id. See generally Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act; Market Stabilization, 82 Fed. Reg. 18346 (Apr.
18, 2017) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 147, 155, 156).
80. Sarah Hansard, Many States Not Prepared to Regulate Health Plan Networks, BLOOMBERG BNA (Mar.
8, 2017), https://www.bna.com/states-not-prepared-n57982084915.
81. Farringer, supra note 12, at 304; Justin Giovannelli & Ashley Williams, Regulation of Narrow
Networks: With Federal Protections in Jeopardy, State Approaches Take on Added Significance, THE
COMMONWEALTH FUND, (Feb. 2, 2017) www.commonwealthfund.org/publications/blog/2017/feb/regulationof-narrow-networks.
82. 42 U.S.C. § 18022(c)(3)(B) (2012); Fuse Brown, supra note 42, at 155.
83. Fuse Brown, supra note 42, at 184.
84. U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, EMP. BENEFITS SEC. ADMIN., supra note 6.
85. Fuse Brown, supra note 42, at 194. For a detailed discussion of ERISA as it relates to patient protections
and possible federal solutions, see id. at 183-199.
86. For example, Sarah Kliff from Vox has been investigating emergency bills and reporting on them since
December 2018, and the Kaiser Family Foundation has an ongoing project with NPR called “Bill of the Month.”
See, e.g., Sarah Kliff, I Read 1,182 Emergency Room Bills This Year. Here’s What I Learned., VOX (Dec. 18,
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expressed his support for a solution to this problem, it seems increasingly likely
that the federal government could reach a bipartisan agreement.87 As of July
2019, there are two bills in the Senate and one in the House, modeled on
successful State legislation.88 If one of these bills, or something similar, is
enacted, it would go a long way to protect patients insured by their employers.

IV. STATE REGULATION
States have had varying levels of success in regulating networks, which has
demonstrated the necessity of striking a careful balance between over and underregulating. In states with little to no regulation, patients remain vulnerable to
surprise balance billing because of their unregulated narrow networks. However,
there is a danger in applying too stringent a standard. The best state laws regulate
network adequacy as well as surprise balance billing, while giving regulators
some flexibility in their enforcement.
A. NETWORK ADEQUACY LAWS
The goal of network adequacy laws is to ensure an appropriate number of
providers within each network to meet the needs of those patients. States have
crafted legislation to achieve this goal in a variety of ways. Some focus on
qualitative measures, others on quantitative, while the best network adequacy
laws use both.89 Other states have focused on requiring plans to inform the
insured about the size and scope of their network.90 Yet, for all the effort states
have put into such laws, networks remain inadequate. States have difficulty
enforcing the laws for all plans, gathering the information needed to stay
updated, and effectively informing patients of their options.
There are three types of quantitative measures of network adequacy:
minimum ratios of providers to enrollees, minimum time or distance to travel to
certain providers, and maximum wait times.91 Each is important in its own way
as they serve slightly different functions. While some states will only use one of
these measures, some states, such as California, use all three.92 This
comprehensive approach provides the most effective way to use quantitative

2018, 7:00 AM), https://www.vox.com/health-care/2018/12/18/18134825/emergency-room-bills-health-carecosts-america; Sarah Kliff, A $20,243 Bike Crash: Zuckerberg Hospital’s Aggressive Tactics Leave Patients
with Big Bills, VOX (Jan. 24, 2019, 4:27 PM), https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2019/1/7/18137967/erbills-zuckerberg-san-francisco-general-hospital; Julie Appleby, Meow-ch! The $48,512 Cat Bite, KAISER
HEALTH NEWS (Feb. 27, 2019), https://khn.org/news/biologist-faces-48512-bill-for-rabies-shot-after-cat-bite.
87. Shefali Luthra & Emmarie Huetteman, Bipartisan Support Builds For Limits On Surprise Medical
Bills, NPR (Feb. 5, 2019, 5:00 AM), https://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2019/02/05/691374149/
bipartisan-support-builds-for-limits-on-surprise-medical-bills.
88. Id. Two bills would follow the California model and impose payment standards, while the other would
take the lead from New York and impose an arbitration system to determine the correct amount of payment.
89. HALL & GINSBURG, supra note 23, at 12.
90. Id. at 7.
91. Id. at 7–8.
92. Id. at 8, exhibit 2.
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measures, as it allows regulators to see the broader picture from multiple
viewpoints. California refers to its combination of these qualitative standards as
“timely access” laws.93
California’s timely access laws attempt to ensure patients can obtain
necessary services in a reasonable amount of time.94 California is one of the few
states that divides its regulation of health plans between two agencies, the
California Department of Insurance (CDI) and the California Department of
Managed Health Care (DMHC).95 CDI promulgates regulations applying to
health insurers.96 Health insurance plans must provide a certain number of
doctors per insured in the area; however, few standards exist for how far away
providers can be, and the hours per week during which emergency and nonemergency providers must be available.97 Similarly, DMHC requires the
managed care plans under its purview to have providers within a reasonable
distance who can adequately serve the enrolled patients.98 The corresponding
regulations also require health plans to ensure a certain number of providers for
enrollees, a certain number of hours of provider availability per week, and
timelines for when a patient must receive different types of appointment after
requesting one.99 The requirements differ for emergency and non-emergency
care, but not for specialties.100 If plans in California cannot comply with the
timely access laws, they cannot sell plans in the state.
However, these timely access requirements in California come with
arduous reporting standards for the health plans and insurers and place a heavy
regulatory burden on CDI and DMHC.101 Insurers and health plans must
constantly file reports on network adequacy, which CDI and DMHC must
review and investigate. These standards are therefore burdensome to enforce as
the regulators have to gather “a daunting amount of information,” including
checking to see if each individual provider is still in the network and accepting
new patients.102 Even when agencies enforce the standards and maintain the
directories, patients with low health literacy still struggle to make use of the
resources given to them.103 While other states have network adequacy
93. Timely Access to Care, CA.GOV, DEP’T OF MANAGED HEALTH CARE, (last accessed May 12, 2019),
https://www.dmhc.ca.gov/HealthCareinCalifornia/YourHealthCareRights/TimelyAccesstoCare.aspx.
94. Id.
95. MAKING SENSE OF MANAGED CARE REGULATION IN CALIFORNIA, CAL. HEALTH CARE FOUND. 5
(2001), https://www.chcf.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/PDF-MakingSenseManagedCareRegulation.pdf.
96. CAL. INS. CODE § 10133.5 (West 2019).
97. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 10, § 2240.1 (2019).
98. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1367 (West 2019).
99. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 28, §§ 1300.67.2, 1300.67.2.2 (2019).
100. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 28, §§ 1300.67.21–1300.67.2.2 (2019).
101. CAL. CODE REGS. tit.10, § 2240.1(l) (2019); CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 28 § 1300.67.2.2(g) (2019); JANE
WISHNER & JEREMY MARKS, ENSURING COMPLIANCE WITH NETWORK ADEQUACY STANDARDS: LESSONS FROM
FOUR STATES 7–8 (2017), https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/88946/2001184-ensuringcompliance-with-network-adequacy-standards-lessons-from-four-states_0.pdf.
102. Fuse Brown, supra note 42, at 156.
103. See generally Helen Levy & Alex Janke, Health Literacy and Access to Care, 21 J. HEALTH COMMC’N.
(2016), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4924568/.
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requirements, their lack of staffing makes their similar standards difficult to
enforce.104 California’s DMHC regulates the largest market in the country and
is the only state which has full-time staff devoted solely to evaluating network
adequacy.105 Even so, it is a never-ending task for the regulators to ensure
compliance with the network adequacy laws.
In some states with quantitative standards to regulate network adequacy,
the standards only apply to certain types of plans, leaving other types of plans
completely unregulated by the quantitative requirements.106 Often, when states
regulate certain types of plans but not others, the regulations only apply to
HMOs, as the regulations are left over from the HMO backlash in the 1990s.107
When quantitative regulations are limited to HMOs, the states fail to regulate
the now more popular PPOs and other similarly structured plans.108
In addition to doing their own monitoring, regulators depend on consumer
complaints to assess network adequacy.109 However, consumers with low health
literacy often do not understand how to file complaints, grievances, or appeals
when faced with problems with provider access.110 In all likelihood, a large
number of patients face inadequate networks and subsequent balance billing, but
fail to report it to regulators because they do not know how. Accordingly,
regulators have no access to that data and are unable to help solve the problem.111
Another focus of network adequacy laws has been to increase transparency,
although the effect of these efforts has been limited by the health literacy
barriers.112 Most general efforts to address transparency in health care have been
directed towards price transparency.113 In terms of network adequacy, states are
increasingly using provider directories to increase transparency.114 Provider
directories theoretically give patients a database to look at the providers in their
area, determine who is accepting new patients, and assess which provider is right
for them.115 However, the providers are not responsible for updating their own
information, the regulators must do continual research to keep the directory

104. WISHNER & MARKS, supra note 101, at 7–8.
105. Id. at 8.
106. See HALL & GINSBURG, supra note 23, at 4. Sixteen states have quantitative standards that apply to all
plans, eleven states have quantitative standards that apply only to plans such as HMOs, and the remaining
twenty-three states do not use quantitative measures of network adequacy. Id.
107. See id. at 1, 4.
108. See id. at 4.
109. WISHNER & MARKS, supra note 101, at 10.
110. See id.
111. See id.
112. See Blake, supra note 49, at 93.
113. See, e.g., Ateev Mehrotra et al., Defining the Goals of Health Care Price Transparency: Not Just
Shopping Around, NEW ENG. J. MED. CATALYST (June 26, 2018) https://catalyst.nejm.org/health-care-pricetransparency-goals/; Andis Robeznieks, 8 Ways to Improve Health Care Price Transparency, AM. MED. ASSN.
(Sept. 20, 2018), https://www.ama-assn.org/practice-management/economics/8-ways-improve-health-careprice-transparency.
114. See, e.g., 45 C.F.R. § 156.235 (2018).
115. Blake, supra note 49, at 93.
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accurate.116 Unfortunately, these directories do not have to be constantly updated
and the frequency of the updates depend on the jurisdiction.117 Furthermore,
patients with low health literacy have a difficult time finding these directories,
and when they do, they do not understand how to meaningfully compare the
providers.118 While provider directories can be useful and do increase
transparency, they are burdensome on regulators, and have limited value given
the frequency with which they are updated and whether patients can effectively
utilize them.
Regulators require flexibility in enforcing network adequacy laws.119
Exceptions and waivers are critical when enforcing network adequacy using
quantitative measures.120 Regulators must be able to look at the market factors
in play and assess which plans need exceptions.121 Rural communities often need
exceptions, as a strict application of network adequacy standards may disqualify
every plan in a rural area.122 Giving regulators flexibility on quantitative
standards also allows for the development of modern medical innovations, such
as telemedicine.123 When quantitative standards are applied strictly in rural
areas, the providers could have extraordinary bargaining power over the plan, as
the plans would have no choice but to include the providers to meet the
requirements.124 If all the plans in a rural area are deemed inadequate, that means
there are no health plans at all for individuals who live in those communities.125
In that case, an inadequate plan is better than no plan.
B. ANY WILLING PROVIDER LAWS
An alternative approach has been to encourage larger networks by using
“any willing provider” laws; however, states have had limited success in
enforcing them. For example, South Dakota recently implemented an “any
willing provider” law through a ballot measure.126 The statute requires health
insurers to accept all providers within the geographic coverage area who are
willing and qualified to meet the terms and conditions of participation as

116. See, e.g., 45 C.F.R. § 156.235 (2018).
117. See id. Blake, supra note 49, at 93; Some states, such as California, require more frequent updates. See,
e.g., WISHNER & MARKS, supra note 101, at 9.
118. See INST. OF MED., COMM. ON HEALTH LITERACY, HEALTH LITERACY: A PRESCRIPTION TO END
CONFUSION 42, tabl. 2-1 (LYNN NIELSEN-BOHLMAN ET AL. EDS., 2004). Many patients do not understand what
they require in a provider and fail to anticipate their future health needs when selecting a plan. HALL &
GINSBURG, supra note 23, at 3.
119. WISHNER & MARKS, supra note 101, at 6–7.
120. Id. at 7.
121. See id.
122. See id.
123. HALL & GINSBURG, supra note 23, at 17.
124. Id. at 6.
125. Id.
126. Ashley Noble, Any Willing or Authorized Providers, NCSL (Nov. 5, 2014), http://www.ncsl.org/
research/health/any-willing-or-authorized-providers.aspx.
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established by the plan.127 This law successfully and severely limits plans in
South Dakota from using skinny networks.128 Yet, it also prevents insurance
companies from negotiating lower prices with providers and facilities, so they
are less able to contain costs for enrollees and cannot disqualify providers based
on quality; hence “any willing provider” laws have been highly criticized.129
“Any willing provider” legislation alone is an insufficient solution to the
problem of overly narrow networks, as it fails to reduce costs for consumers,
there is no guarantee that providers will ask to join the networks, and plans have
no ability to control the quality of providers with whom they contract.
C. BALANCE BILLING PROTECTIONS
Even when states have network adequacy standards that they try their best
to enforce, those standards do not eradicate the problem of balance billing.
Network adequacy laws, such as California’s, only create minimum
requirements, but do not eliminate skinny networks.130 When paired with
surprise balance billing laws, network adequacy standards can protect patients
from financial harm. Balance billing laws range from fully comprehensive to
ineffective in practice. The best laws include set reimbursement standards for
non-contracting providers, and mandate dispute resolution mechanisms which
do not involve the patient.131 Less effective laws simply notify patients that they
may receive care from out-of-network providers, apply only to emergency
balance bills, or otherwise fail to explain what a prohibition on balance bills
looks like in practice, allowing plans and providers to easily avoid the laws and
continue charging higher rates.132
California passed a prohibition against surprise balance billing in 2016.133
The statute requires all health plans and insurers to cover these out-of-network
costs by reimbursing “the greater of the average contracted rate or 125 percent
of the amount Medicare reimburses,” also known as the default rate.134 The
enrollee only pays the “same cost sharing that the enrollee would pay for the
same covered services received from a contracting individual health
professional.”135 Patients are taken out of the equation as the providers and
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.

Id.
Baicker & Levy, supra note 46, at 2.
HALL & GINSBURG, supra note 23, at 5–6; See Baiker & Levy, supra note 46, at 2.
Fuse Brown, supra note 42, at 147.
See id. at 178.
See Jack Hoadley et al., State Efforts to Protect Consumers from Balance Billing, THE
COMMONWEALTH FUND (Jan. 18, 2019), https://www.commonwealthfund.org/blog/2019/state-efforts-protectconsumers-balance-billing.
133. Assemb. B. No. 72: Health Care Coverage: Out-of-Network Coverage, ch. 492 (Cal. 2016) (codified
as amended at CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 1371.30, 1371.31, 1371.9 (West 2019), CAL. INS.
CODE §§ 10112.8, 10112.81, 10112.82 (West 2019)).
134. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1371.31(a)(1) (West 2019); CAL. INS. CODE § 10112.82(a)(1) (West
2019).
135. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1371.9(a)(1) (West 2017); CAL. INS. CODE § 10112.8(a)(1) (West
2019).
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health plans must use a binding independent dispute resolution process to
resolve payment disputes.136 A patient may waive her rights to the balance
billing protection if she chooses to use a non-contracting provider or facility.137
However, the statute protects patients by requiring a binding written estimate of
the cost and written consent twenty-four hours in advance, so patients are never
surprised with a balance bill.138 While these California protections safeguard
patients, they necessarily create even more government overhead, and impose
compliance costs on health plans and providers.
Only eight other states have such comprehensive patient financial
protections as California, although California’s are arguably one of the
strongest, with New York coming in as a close second.139 Only California and
New York have both payment standards for all out-of-network care and dispute
resolution processes.140 New York pioneered state laws to protect consumers
from the harmful practice of balance billing.141 Like California, New York
prohibits surprise balance billing of patients, requiring written consent when a
patient wants to use a non-contracting provider.142 It also established standards
for determining a reasonable fee and imposed a binding dispute resolution
process for providers and insurers when either party disputes a proposed fee.143
New York has served as a successful model of patient financial protection before
even the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC), and states
like California have taken note of its success.
Connecticut, Florida, Illinois, Maryland, and more recently New
Hampshire, New Jersey, and Oregon have also adopted comprehensive
approaches to balance billing.144 Comprehensive protections apply to both
HMOs and PPOs in emergency and in-network hospital settings, holding
consumers harmless from surprise balance bills, and creating adequate payment
standards or a dispute resolution process so non-contracting providers receive
payment for their services.145 These standards have proven fairly effective in
protecting patients, although there are problems in establishing appropriate
payments for non-contracting providers.146 The problem with lacking either a

136. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1371.30 (West 2019); CAL. INS. CODE § 10112.81 (West 2019).
137. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1371.9(c) (West 2019); CAL. INS. CODE § 10112.8(c) (West 2019).
138. Id.
139. Hoadley et al., supra note 132132; see also Fuse Brown, supra note 42, at 151–52; Kevin Lucia et al.,
Balance Billing by Health Care Providers: Assessing Consumer Protections Across States, 16 THE
COMMONWEALTH FUND 1, 3 (2017), http://www.commonwealthfund.org/~/media/files/publications/issuebrief/2017/jun/lucia_balance_billing_ib.pdf (analyzing balance billing protections in the United States).
140. See Fuse Brown, supra note 42, at 149, 151–52.
141. Id. at 149.
142. N.Y. FIN. SERV. §§ 603, 606 (McKinney 2019).
143. N.Y. FIN. SERV. §§ 604, 607 (McKinney 2019).
144. Hoadley et al., supra note 132.
145. Lucia et al., supra note 139, at 4.
146. Id. at 4.
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payment standard or dispute resolution process is that patients get dragged into
the disagreement.147
When working within complicated regulatory frameworks that deal with
network adequacy and balance billing, external review processes are crucial.
There are two types of processes: external review of a patient’s request for
necessary medical care and dispute resolution about the payment for that care.148
When patients require care from out-of-network specialists, states should
impose an external review process to ensure fair determinations as to whether
the plan should cover those services.149 Around half the states have such
processes, but several require multiple internal reviews before a patient can
reach the external review, which can impede the patient’s timely access to
care.150 Once that external reviewer determines the patient needs out-of-network
care, states should have a clear and just system for determining an appropriate
payment without patient involvement.151
Fifteen other states have a limited approach to preventing surprise balance
billing, but most only pertain to emergency services, which, as discussed above,
is woefully insufficient, as ninety percent of surprise balance bills occur in nonemergency contexts.152 Some states, like Colorado, do not prohibit surprise
balance bills, but only provide hold harmless provisions, which can confuse
patients who do not understand that they do not have to pay the bill.153 Other
states, such as Texas, limit the protection to HMOs, when most of its citizens
have PPOs.154 The biggest problem for states with only limited protections on
surprise balance billing is the lack of dispute resolution mechanisms or payment
standards.155 These gaps in the laws and regulations have led providers to abuse
the system, charging even higher prices to insurance companies and patients.156
Yet the situation is even worse in the other twenty-nine states that lack any such
protections for their citizens. In those states, patients can be blindsided with
massive surprise balance bills, with no recourse but to pay them at the cost of
their own financial security.

147. Id. at 3.
148. HALL & GINSBURG, supra note 23, at 13, 16.
149. Id. at 13.
150. Id. at 13, n.51.
151. Id. at 13; Lucia et al., supra note 139, at 6.
152. Lucia et al., supra note 139, at 4; Pollitz, supra note 59.
153. Lucia et al., supra note 139, at 6. A hold harmless provision is a “requirement that insurers pay
providers their billed charges or some lower amount that is acceptable to the provider.” Id. at 4.
154. Id. at 4.
155. Id. at 6.
156. Id. According to Lucia et al.:
Providers have used this lack of specificity to charge high amounts to insurers, who must pay the
balance bill to avoid consumer liability, resulting in higher overall health costs. In New Jersey, for
instance, the absence of a standard may encourage providers to remain out of network—by opting
not to accept a discounted payment rate with an insurer—and then charge higher prices through
balance billing, potentially contributing to the state’s high hospital charges and high premiums.
Id.
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D. MODEL LEGISLATION
The NAIC created a Network Adequacy Model Act in 2015 in response to
the narrowing of networks after the implementation of the ACA.157 The NAIC
did not intend for states to adopt the Model Act exactly as written, but to shape
it to fit the needs of the individual state.158 However, four states (Colorado,
Georgia, Hawaii and Maryland) adopted it in its entirety.159 The Model Act
requires that all health plans “shall maintain a network that is sufficient in
numbers and appropriate types of providers, including those that serve
predominantly low-income, medically underserved individuals, to assure that all
covered services to covered persons, including children and adults, will be
accessible without unreasonable travel or delay.”160 While the Model Act
identifies an important goal, it fails to provide standards for achieving that
goal.161
In addition to regulating network adequacy, the Model Act also touches on
balance billing. It includes a provision which requires health plans to have a
“process to assure that a covered person obtains a covered benefit at an innetwork level of benefits, including an in-network level of cost-sharing, from a
non-participating provider” when the circumstances require a patient to be out
of network.162 In theory, this should eliminate the practice of surprise balance
billing, but the Model Act does not fully prohibit balance billing.163 Even when
states adopt the Model Act in its entirety, they still cannot completely protect
patients.164

V. PRIVATE SECTOR SOLUTIONS
Where state protections are often inadequate, the private sector has stepped
in with its own solutions. Health systems have been engaging in different levels
of integration, with varying degrees of success for patients and system profit
margins. For the large population of Americans who get their health insurance
from their employer, the employing companies have the market power to protect
their employees from overly narrow networks and surprise balance bills.

157. HEALTH BENEFIT PLAN NETWORK ACCESS AND ADEQUACY MODEL ACT (NAT’L ASS’N OF INS.
COMM’RS 2015) [hereinafter NAIC MODEL ACT], http://www.naic.org/store/free/MDL-74.pdf.
158. NAIC MODEL ACT §§ 1, 2.
159. State
Legislative
Brief,
NAIC
(Dec.
2018),
http://www.naic.org/documents/
cmte_legislative_liaison_brief_network_adequacy.pdf.
160. NAIC MODEL ACT § 5(A)(1).
161. WISHNER & MARKS, supra note 101, at 4.
162. NAIC MODEL ACT § 5(C).
163. Fuse Brown, supra note 42, at 154.
164. See id.
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A. VERTICAL AND HORIZONTAL INTEGRATION
Many advocates argue for a more integrated private health care system,
which would solve some of the problems with balance billing and improve
coordination of care.165 There are two types of integration: horizontal and
vertical. Horizontal integration occurs when one entity engulfs another that
provides roughly the same product or service, for example, the consolidation of
two physician practices.166 Vertical integration entails the merger of two entities
that operate in different sectors of the market, such as a hospital and a physician
group.167 Hospitals have been acquiring physician practice groups, which have
also increased in size over the past few years.168 With more contracting
physician practices, there is a decreased chance that a patient will have to go
outside his network to obtain necessary diagnosis or treatment. Because patients
can remain in-network with larger physician practices, they are less likely to be
balance billed. Supporters of greater hospital-physician integration argue that it
lowers costs—as care is coordinated within one system—while simultaneously
improving quality of care.169
On the other hand, too much consolidation leads to abuses of market
power.170 Indeed, research suggests that hospital acquisition of physician
practices leads to a fourteen percent price increase per group acquired, with even
higher prices being reported when the acquiring entity has a large share of the
patient market.171 Furthermore, as entities leverage their vertical integration into
horizontal monopolies, they provide lower quality care as they lack the
competition that requires them to compete to provide the best quality of care at
an optimal price.172
Kaiser Permanente is a successful model of a fully vertically integrated
health system.173 Kaiser has its own hospitals, medical groups, and health plans.
165. David C. Szostak, Vertical Integration in Health Care: The Regulatory Landscape, 17 DEPAUL J.
HEALTH CARE L. 65, 69-71 (2015).
166. Miriam J. Laugesen & George France, Integration: The Firm and the Health Care Sector, 9 HEALTH
ECON., POL’Y & L. 295, 298 (2014).
167. See id. at 296.
168. Cory Capps et al., The Effect of Hospital Acquisitions of Physician Practices on Prices and Spending,
59 J. HEALTH ECON. 139, 139–140 (2018).
169. Id. at 140.
170. See Reed Abelson, The Face of Future Health Care, N.Y. TIMES, (Mar. 20, 2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/21/business/kaiser-permanente-is-seen-as-face-of-future-health-care.html.
171. Capps et al., supra note 168, at 151. Some doctors who have seen the system evolve argue we should
fix payment systems that reward high prices and excessive service use (fee-for-service payments, for example),
instead of focusing on vertical integration. Robert Berenson, A Physician’s Perspective on Vertical Integration,
36 HEALTH AFFAIRS 1585, 1588 (2017).
172. See generally Marah Noel Short & Vivian Ho, Weighing the Effects of Vertical Integration Versus
Market Concentration on Hospital Quality, MED. CARE RES. & REV. (Feb. 9, 2019); Eric C. Schneider, Provider
Mergers: Will Patients Get Higher Quality or Higher Costs?, THE COMMONWEALTH FUND (Nov. 20, 2015),
https://www.commonwealthfund.org/blog/2015/provider-mergers-will-patients-get-higher-quality-or-highercosts.
173. Szostak, supra note 165, at 71–72. Yet, given antitrust laws, even Kaiser is not a completely verticallyintegrated health care system as defined by Szostak.
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Kaiser and its health plans function as a very large HMO, with a very broad
network. Kaiser members do not receive surprise balance bills for planned
procedures, because it is impossible for them to unknowingly interact with noncontracting providers or facilities. However, a Kaiser patient could still
encounter the situation of being transported to a non-Kaiser hospital in the event
of an emergency, where they would be billed according to the state policies on
emergency care. While some patients dislike Kaiser because it does not allow
them to choose any doctor or hospital they want, Kaiser’s incredibly broad
network covers the needs of almost all of its patients without them ever having
to go out of network.174 A closed network system like Kaiser’s can be
appropriate as long as it is sufficiently broad. However, while Kaiser is one of
the best solutions from the private sector, it is not a flawless system. Kaiser has
not been immune to the overall rising costs of health care; premiums have been
rising steadily over the past twenty years, including Kaiser Health Plans.175
When patients are surprise balance billed, they experience financial harm. Even
if they are in the Kaiser system and avoid such bills, they still feel the effect of
overall rising costs of health care when they pay increasingly large premiums
and co-payments.
B. STRUCTURING AND CHOOSING HEALTH PLANS
Companies that purchase health plans for their employees have a lot of
market power, which they can use to address network inadequacy problems.
Healthy employees are more productive employees, so many businesses have
started to focus on their employees’ wellbeing.176 Large and successful
companies have started to offer plans with broad coverage to their employees to
better take care of their employees.177 These large entities have the market power
to make wide-network plans more affordable to ensure that their employees are
never out of network, and never get left with a surprise balance bill.178
Unfortunately, small employers do not have the same market power and may
struggle to obtain sufficiently broad network plans that protect their employees,
174. Abelson, supra note 170. If, for example, a patient wants experimental or specialized care from a
certain facility outside of the Kaiser network, the patient would pay for that treatment entirely out of pocket.
Furthermore, like almost all health plans and health systems in the United States, Kaiser struggles to deliver
convenient care to its rural members. Access to health care in rural areas is an issue this Note does not attempt
to address. For an in-depth look at policy in this area, see Nicole Huberfeld, Rural Health, Universality, and
Legislative Targeting, 13 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 241 (2018).
175. Premiums and Worker Contributions Among Workers Covered by Employer-Sponsored Coverage,
1999-2018, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Oct. 3, 2018), https://www.kff.org/interactive/premiums-and-workercontributions-among-workers-covered-by-employer-sponsored-coverage-1999-2018/.
176. See generally Leonard L. Berry et al., What’s the Hard Return on Employee Wellness Programs?,
HARV. BUS. REV. (Dec. 2010), https://hbr.org/2010/12/whats-the-hard-return-on-employee-wellness-programs.
177. See, e.g., Laura Lorenzetti, These 11 Companies Offer 100% Healthcare Coverage, FORTUNE (Mar.
11, 2015), http://fortune.com/2015/03/11/companies-offer-all-healthcare-coverage.
178. See Patricia A. McDonald et al., The Employer-Led Health Care Revolution, HARV. BUS. REV. (July–
Aug. 2015), https://hbr.org/2015/07/the-employer-led-health-care-revolution (arguing that employers have the
market power necessary to make changes to the healthcare system).
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which leaves those employees with only their state’s protections to shield them
from balance bills.

VI. PROPOSAL: STATE SINGLE PAYER
America’s traditional combination of regulation and market competition is
failing in the health care sphere. The health insurance and provider markets are
highly concentrated with large players wielding too much market power.179
Because these few companies control so much of the market, they have little
incentive to lower their premiums and negotiate better deals with providers.180
Without an effective market to bring down costs, regulations alone are
insufficient and unwieldy. A state-run single payer, “Medicare for All” system
similar to Canada’s would solve the problem of overregulation and insufficient
market competition.181 In such a system, all citizens of the state would be insured
through a state health plan; no one would be insured on the individual market or
through their employers.
A. THE BENEFITS OF STATE SINGLE PAYER
State single payer health care would eliminate the problems of surprise
balance billing, as patients would not be required to pay for their health care outof-pocket. If state insurance covered all licensed providers, a patient would
effectively never be able to go out-of-network within the state. The single payer
solution is elegant, unlike the current system. Healthcare at the state and federal
levels remains fragmented and massively convoluted, meaning a lot of money
goes into unnecessary overhead costs. When a single entity provides and
regulates the health insurance of all citizens, it can greatly reduce the overall
administrative costs.182 There would be no tangled web of health plans and
insurers who contract with different providers, medical groups, facilities,
employers who provide health plans, and multiple regulatory authorities
governing all parties. By streamlining the health care payment system, states
could make significant reductions in costs for its citizens.
In addition, establishing a system where the patient does not have to worry
about the adequacy of her network or how she will pay for a certain procedure
may actually increase health outcomes.183 Teaching health literacy is a less
daunting task when educators do not have to instruct people about how to ensure
that the care they need will actually be covered. Furthermore, lower levels of

179. Leemore S. Dafny, Are Health Insurance Markets Competitive?, 100 AM. ECON. REV. 1399, 1400–
1401 (2010).
180. See id.
181. See Sara Allin & David Rudoler, The Canadian Health Care System, THE COMMONWEALTH FUND,
https://international.commonwealthfund.org/countries/canada/ (last visited July 27, 2019).
182. Jonathan Oberlander, The Virtues and Vices of Single-Payer Health Care, 374 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1401,
1402 (2016).
183. See Clark, supra note 52, at 256.
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health literacy lead to lower access to care,184 perhaps in part because people are
afraid they will be unable to pay for it. There is a correlation between low health
literacy and poorer health.185 Creating a single payer system will increase access
to preventative care and other necessary treatment, which will improve the lives
of patients and lower the overall cost on society.
There is also a compelling moral argument for single payer. Health care
should be a human right, not a privilege for the wealthy.186 People should not be
able to fall into bankruptcy because they had the audacity to get sick. In the
preamble to its constitution, the World Health Organization declared that “[t]he
enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of health is one of the fundamental
rights of every human being without distinction of race, religion, political belief,
economic or social condition.”187 The United Nations recognized the “right to a
standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and of his
family, including . . . medical care” in its 1948 Universal Declaration of Human
Rights.188 Yet 70 years later in 2018, people in the United States still bankrupt
themselves in order to obtain necessary medical care.
B. THE OBSTACLES TO STATE SINGLE PAYER
One of the biggest obstacles to a state single payer system is the cost, and
states need to be able to reapportion federal Medicaid and Medicare funding.189
The ACA has an innovation waiver provision that went into effect in 2017,
enabling states to continue receiving the aggregate federal funding that would
have gone to individual residents and to use that funding to finance a new
system.190 This section 1332 waiver allows states to address problems stemming
from the removal of the individual mandate penalty and more comprehensively
address balance billing and network adequacy using federal funding. Some
states have already used these waivers and are implementing new programs.191
However, the section 1332 waivers likely would not give states sufficient
flexibility to fully implement a state single payer system. California’s new

184. Id. at 268.
185. Id.
186. See generally Mariah McGill & Gillian MacNaughton, The Struggle to Achieve the Human Right to
Health Care in the United States, 25 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 625 (2016).
187. WORLD HEALTH ORG., BASIC DOCUMENTS: CONSTITUTION OF THE WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION 1
(45th ed. 2006).
188. G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, A Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Dec. 10, 1948).
189. For example, single payer in California is estimated to cost $400 billion. Patricia Cohen & Reed
Abelson, Single-Payer Health Care in California: Here’s What It Would Take, N.Y. TIMES (May 25, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/25/business/economy/california-single-payer.html; Chad Terhune, Tab for
Single-Payer Proposal in California Could Run $400 Billion, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (May 23, 2017),
https://khn.org/news/tab-for-single-payer-proposal-in-california-could-run-400-billion/.
190. 42 U.S.C. § 18052 (2012); McGill & MacNaughton, supra note 186186, at 666.
191. Tracking Section 1332 State Innovation Waivers, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (May 10, 2019),
https://www.kff.org/health-reform/fact-sheet/tracking-section-1332-state-innovation-waivers.
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governor, Gavin Newsom, already called for federal legislation which would
allow for a new type of waiver.192
Favorable public opinion is also crucial to successfully implementing a
single payer system in any state. People across the country are confused about
what “Medicare for All” means, and reasonably so as individual politicians
define it differently.193 Once political leaders agree on what kind of system they
want to implement, they will need to be able to effectively communicate the
nature and cost to their constituents in order to garner their support. Not only is
the actual cost of single payer an obstacle, but citizens’ perception of that cost
impacts the feasibility of such a system. Creating a state single payer system will
be politically challenging and administratively difficult, but Democraticmajority states might just have the motivation to achieve it.
C. THE LIMITATIONS OF STATE SINGLE PAYER
Unfortunately, state single payer systems will not be a panacea for
America’s health care woes. Those in rural communities will still have trouble
getting care, even if all providers are covered by their state’s insurance system.
The state government will need to take on the administrative work currently
being done by insurance. While this will likely be a more efficient system in the
long term, insurance companies will have to lay off employees, find new
business, or go out of business entirely. Policymakers will have to consider how
to ensure that providers still compete with each other to maximize quality and
innovation. In doing so, they should not limit themselves to a Canadian model,
as Canada’s system is currently being challenged by those who say its strict ban
on private supplementary insurance violates Canadian’s constitutional
guarantees to certain human rights.194 Indeed, the current U.S. system may be
more conducive to reforms following the Bismarck model as used in countries
like Germany and Japan, which maintains private insurance.195 Yet, a single

192. Letter from Gavin Newsom, Cal. Governor, to Donald J. Trump, President, et al. (Jan. 7, 2019),
https://www.gov.ca.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/1.7.19-Letter-to-the-White-House-and-Congress.pdf.
While it might seem unthinkable that a Republican controlled Senate and White House would ever agree to such
legislation, Newsom’s request might be compatible with the kind of state control Republicans have long wanted
for health care. See Shefali Luthra, Everything You Need to Know About Block Grants—The Heart of GOP’s
Medicaid Plans, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Jan. 24, 2017), https://khn.org/news/block-grants-medicaid-faq.
193. See Ashley Kirzinger et al., KFF Health Tracking Poll–January 2019: The Public on Next Steps for
the ACA and Proposals to Expand Coverage, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Jan. 23, 2019), https://www.kff.org/healthreform/poll-finding/kff-health-tracking-poll-january-2019/; Ezra Klein, Democrats’ Confused, and Confusing,
Medicare-for-All
Debate,
VOX
(Feb.
5,
2019),
https://www.vox.com/policy-andpolitics/2019/2/5/18209945/medicare-for-all-bernie-sanders-kamala-harris-cory-booker-single-payer.
194. See Chaoulli v. Quebec, 2005 SCC 35, paras. 273–78, [2005] 1 S.C.R. 791 (Can.) (holding the
prohibition on private insurers, giving citizens no alternative to avoid excessively long wait times to access care,
violated the Canadian and Quebec Charters); Cambie Surgeries Corp. v. British Columbia, 2018 BCSC 2084,
para. 189 (temporarily enjoining the enforcement of the private insurance ban in British Columbia following the
reasoning in Chaoulli), appeal denied 2019 BCCA 29 (Can.).
195. The Bismarck model is a multi-payor model, but heavily regulates the private insurers to contain costs
and ensure universal coverage. Summary of International Health Systems, PHYSICIANS FOR A NAT’L HEALTH
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payer system would most efficiently eliminate out-of-network bills, because all
providers would be in network. Single payer will not be a flawless system, nor
will it be painless to implement. However, on the whole, it will get patients the
care they need without imposing burdensome medical debt.

CONCLUSION
Working within the framework of the current U.S. health system, there are
many solutions available for states to protect their citizens from the financial
harm of medical treatment and bills. The private sector can look to the Kaiser
model of health integration, which prevents patients from being out of network,
but they should be cautious to avoid the problems of monopolistic acquisition of
physician practices. The limited approach to balance billing protection taken by
many states is insufficient. States can look to California and New York to create
balance billing protections and network adequacy standards that actually protect
citizens. Yet ERISA prevents even the most robust state protections from
actually protecting all citizens. The time is right for states to begin exploring the
option of state-run single payer health care systems. While it would be a
complicated and daunting enterprise, establishing a single payer system would
solve the problems of inadequate networks and surprise balance billing. States
should be the great laboratories of democracy and discover what it would look
like to have a single payer system in the United States.

PROGRAM
(Apr.
Comparison.pdf.

2011),

http://caphysiciansalliance.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/11/International-
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